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I distinguish between what I call ‗substantival‘ and ‗functional‘ forms of vitalism in the 
eighteenth century. Substantival vitalism presupposes the existence of something like a 
(substantive) vital force which either plays a causal role in the natural world as studied 
by scientific means, or remains a kind of hovering, extra-causal entity. Functional 
vitalism tends to operate ‗post facto‘, from the existence of living bodies to the desire to 
find explanatory models that will do justice to their uniquely ‗vital‘ properties in a way 
that fully mechanistic (Cartesian, Boerhaavian etc.) models cannot. I discuss some 
representative figures of the Montpellier school (Bordeu, Ménuret, Fouquet) as being 
functional rather than substantival vitalists. Time allowing, I will make an additional 
point regarding the reprisal of vitalism(s) in ‗late modernity‘, as some call it; from Hans 
Driesch to Georges Canguilhem. I suggest that in addition to the substantival and 
functional varieties, we then encounter a third species of vitalism, which I term 
‗attitudinal‘, as it argues for vitalism as a kind of attitude. 
 
 
 
 
I shall not speak here of ‗organicism‘ proper but rather of vitalism; yet the main aspects 
of the doctrine or rather set of doctrines I shall discuss under the heading ‗vitalism‘ will 
be their understanding of organic order, of what distinguishes organisms from 
inanimate beings, and so forth. Vitalism has suffered from its nineteenth-century 
reinterpretations in terms of ‗vital forces‘ and ‗entelechies‘, notably at the hands of Hans 
Driesch (Driesch 1914). It continues to be presented as a very extreme, almost mystical 
view in current biological and philosophical discourse: in a recent review essay on the 
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status of theoretical biology, we are told that ―in vitalism, living matter is ontologically 
greater than the sum of its parts because of some life force (―entelechy,‖ ―élan vital,‖ ―vis 
essentialis,‖ etc.) which is added to or infused into the chemical parts‖1; the authors 
prefer, precisely, the term ‗organicism‘ for the family of theories they wish to defend. 
But when we consider the body of writings produced by the ‗Montpellier vitalists‘, that 
is, the physicians associated with the Faculty of Medicine at the University of 
Montpellier in the second half of the eighteenth century (the school considered in 
doctrinal terms was extended into the early nineteenth century by figures such as 
Jacques Lordat, but on increasingly dogmatic, non-clinical bases), notably Théophile de 
Bordeu, Louis de La Caze, Henri Fouquet, Jean-Joseph Ménuret de Chambaud and, 
best-known, Paul-Joseph Barthez, we find no traces of such metaphysically laden vital 
forces – or hardly any traces, for Barthez flirts with the idea in the first edition of his 
Nouveaux éléments de la science de l’homme (1778; revised 1806) but gives up it 
subsequently.2 Hence one can interpret this ‗Enlightenment‘ form of vitalism as 
functional rather than substantive, as I have argued recently (Wolfe 2008, 2009b): it is 
more of an attempt to ‗model‘ or ‗describe‘ organic life without reducing it to fully 
mechanical models or processes, than an overt metaphysics of Life. 
But perhaps we should not be too quick to dismiss the metaphysical 
commitments of vitalism and happily proclaim that it is a more ‗modern‘, egalitarian 
vision of embodiment free from some of the aporias of the ‗dialectic of Enlightenment‘ 
(as suggested recently by Elizabeth Williams, or in a quite different way by Peter Hans 
Reill; see Williams 2003, Reill 2005). That is, maybe it is impossible to have a viable 
concept of vitalism without also having some degree of a metaphysical commitment 
                                                 
1 Gilbert and Sarkar (2000), p. 1. 
2 Barthez had initially asserted the existence of an independent vital force, but withdrew this and added a 
chapter to the second edition of his book entitled ―Skeptical considerations on the nature of the vital 
principle‖ (Barthez [1858], III, p. 96f.; all translations are mine unless otherwise indicated). He warned that 
one should follow an ―invincible skepticism‖ (p. 32) or a ―reasonable Pyrrhonism‖ (p. 274) when it comes 
to the vital principle. He only ―personified‖ the vital principle, he explains, for ease of argument (p. 126). 
What does it mean to investigate the nature of life skeptically? Contrary to what one might expect, it does 
not mean to approach vital phenomena with a demystifying, deflationary attitude, but rather, that Barthez 
only wants to attribute properties to the vital principle ―that result immediately from experience‖ (ibid.).  
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towards either (a) the uniqueness of living beings within the physical universe (this is 
the classic version, that of Georg-Ernest Stahl and, differently, of Driesch‘s ‗neo-
vitalism‘) or (b) the idea that the act of understanding what is unique about living 
beings requires a certain kind of attitude (this is the modern version, articulated by 
Georges Canguilhem, who went so far as to proclaim himself a vitalist; see Canguilhem 
1955, 1965). 
In this paper I want to return to the relation between the Montpelliérain model of 
organism (organized bodies, organization, animal economy) and more metaphysically 
committed forms of vitalism such as Stahl‘s ‗animism‘, focusing in particular on Stahl‘s 
Theoria medica vera, Bordeu‘s Recherches anatomiques sur la position des glandes (Stahl 
1730/1860, Bordeu 1751), and Ménuret‘s articles in the Encyclopédie. I will suggest that 
the Newtonian-influenced, organizational, functional models of life developed by the 
Montpellier vitalists open onto an ‗attitudinal‘ vitalism which can survive the various 
counter-arguments mounted over the course of the twentieth century, from the Vienna 
Circle onwards. But this attitudinal vitalism may still require (or ‗be‘) a metaphysics. 
 
1. Substantival versus functional vitalism 
We are familiar, I think, with vitalism as a strong, ontologically laden 
commitment to the existence of certain entities or ‗forces‘, over and above the system of 
causal relations studied and modeled by mechanical or mechanistic science, which itself 
seeks to express these entities or the relations between them in mathematical terms.3 
This is a common, indeed dominant view of the subject, whether it is presented in 
positive terms, as a kind of commendable backlash against the de-humanizing, 
alienating trend inaugurated by the Scientific Revolution, which seeks to ‗revitalize the 
world‘ (and one can hear echoes here of ‗reenchantment‘4) or in negative terms, as a 
                                                 
3 That this picture of ‗mechanism‘ is itself quite caricatural or simplistic is not a topic for the present paper; 
I discuss the complexity of various forms of 17th and 18th century mechanism faced with Life in Wolfe 
(forthcoming 2010). 
4 Cf. Elizabeth Williams‘ comment that Montpellier vitalism ―entailed consequences markedly at odds 
with the universalizing discourse of Encyclopedist materialism, with its insistence on the uniformity of 
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kind of anti-scientific or ‗para-scientific‘ trend which needs to be refuted (an example 
that comes to mind is Francis Crick‘s rather confident pronouncement, sounding very 
much like someone who feels he has the whole scientific community behind him: ―To 
those of you who may be vitalists, I would make this prophecy: what everyone believed 
yesterday, and you believe today, only cranks will believe tomorrow‖5). And there is 
plenty of historical evidence that such a position existed – even if interpreters have 
regularly made the mistake of retrospectively projecting the category ‗vitalism‘ 
backwards onto all sorts of disparate figures, from Aristotle to Harvey, from Glisson to 
Diderot, from Bichat to Bernard.6 
 But there is something wrong with this vision of things; not because we can 
adduce one counter-example (such as when, faced with the claim that all 18th-century 
materialists were atheists, we can put forth the case of mortalist physicians such as 
William Coward, for whom the soul is mortal yet is resurrected at the time of the Last 
Judgment7) but because an entire school does not fit the description: the so-called 
‗Montpellier vitalists‘, best known to eighteenth-century scholars because of their 
relation to Diderot (including his ‗postmodern‘ usage of Bordeu as a fictional character 
in D’Alembert’s Dream8) and the Encyclopédie. And they are the ones for whom the term 
‗vitalist‘ was coined! 
Who are they? Louis de Lacaze, Jean-Joseph Ménuret de Chambaud, Henri 
Fouquet, Théophile de Bordeu and perhaps most famously, Paul-Joseph Barthez. More 
info. Barthez expresses a desire not to be equated with other vitalists: ―I do not wish to 
                                                                                                                                                              
nature and the universality of physical laws‖ (2003, p. 177) – despite my appreciation of Williams‘ work 
overall and our past and future shared projects, I disagree with this statement. Further work would have 
to confront this with Reill‘s vision of a ‗vitalized‘ Enlightenment in his (2005). The difference is that he 
thinks the Enlightenment has been misinterpreted precisely in this mechanistic fashion. If we think of 
figures such as La Mettrie, Buffon and Diderot it seems fair to say that the materialists did not have such 
strong beliefs in universal laws and most importantly, were ‗embodied‘ theorists. I argue the case for La 
Mettrie in Wolfe (2009c) and for Diderot in Wolfe (2009a).  
5 Crick (1966), p. 99. 
6 Walter Pagel is a particular culprit here in the history of medical thought. 
7 Thomson (2008), ch. 4. 
8 Dieckmann (1938); Kaitaro (1997), ch. 3; Boury (2003). 
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be the Leader of the Sect of the Vitalists.‖9 When Barthez speaks of this ‗sect‘ he 
probably has in mind Charles-Louis Dumas, the author of a vitalist ‗synthesis‘ published 
in 1800-1803 and, starting in 1807, the Dean of the ‗Ecole de Santé‘ in Montpellier. ―It 
was Dumas who, to further his ambitions and to defend Montpellier amid the 
institutional upheavals brought about by the Revolution, first began referring to 
‗vitalism‘, using this neologism to stress the unity and range of Montpellier teaching‖ 
(Williams [2003], p. 276).  
The Montpellier medical faculty was one of the oldest in Europe, possibly the 
oldest, only preceded by the ‗school‘ at Salerno in the 11th and 12th centuries AD (the 
manuscripts of which were kept from then until now at the monastery at nearby Monte 
Cassino), which was not however incorporated with license to train students. A first 
document in 1240 states the rules of the School at Montpellier, ―by the Prior of Saint-
Firmin, Pierre de Conques and the Franciscan Hugues Mans, who had been called in to 
arbitrate between the instructors and the students‖; these regulations are in addition to 
the rules concerning the organization of the School, set out in 1220 by Cardinal 
Conrad.10 
 Following the groundbreaking work of Rey (1987/2000), Duchesneau et al. 
(1997), and Williams (2003), who have done much to put it on the map, I have tried to 
argue that  the Montpellier vitalist school expresses a ‗structural-functional‘ form of 
vitalism, with the celebrated image of the bee-swarm (found in Maupertuis, Bordeu, 
Diderot and also Ménuret‘s Encyclopédie article cited below) expressing the structural 
relation between one life and many lives (Wolfe and Terada [2008]). The bee-swarm is 
the single most famous image and, really, conceptual construct of 18th-century vitalism. 
Here is Bordeu‘s version: 
How to understand the action of all the parts, their departments, and their periodic 
motions. 
Most physiologists only discuss circulation in general [en gros]; they do not notice 
that it can be quite different in large vessels and in the smaller ones. Couldn‘t 
                                                 
9 Barthez (1806), p. 98, n. 18. 
10 Vidal (1958), p. 77. 
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each part even have its own circulation, which might increase or diminish, 
without the overall (general) circulation being affected? It appears that 
circulations are more or less prompt, according to the different orders of the 
vessels, and according to the action and use of the parts. All of these truths may 
be considered as corollaries of what I have asserted thus far. 
Hence there is a general circulation, and many particular circulations, which are, 
if I may speak thus, like small circles which gradually form a larger one. We have 
customarily used the term ‗circle‘ to convey that a part, even if it receives blood 
by means of the general circulation, as occurring in the largest vessels, 
nevertheless has a particular circulation, depending on whether it is in action or 
not; the other parts which ‗feel‘ [qui se ressentent de] this action, belong to its 
department, its circle, etc. 
Hence the least part should be considered  as ‗a body apart‘, so to speak. True, it 
acts by means of the general circulation, but it is as distinct as the system of blood 
vessels is distinct from the chiliac vessel system, or as the circulation of the lung 
and the liver are from what occurs in ordinary large vessels. 
Might I make use of a comparison which, however rough, may be useful? 
I compare the living body, in order to properly assess the particular action of each 
part, to a swarm of bees which cluster together [se ramassent en pelotons], and hang 
from a tree like a bunch of grapes; I find the image suggested by an ancient 
author, that one of the lower organs was an animal in animali11, to be quite helpful. 
Each part is, so to speak, not quite an animal, but a kind of independent machine 
[machine à part] which contributes [concourt] in its way to the general life of the 
body. 
Hence, following the comparison to a bee swarm, it is a whole stuck to a tree 
branch, by means of the action of many bees which must act in concert to hold on; 
some others become attached to the initial ones, and so on; all concur [concourent]  
in forming a fairly solid body, yet each one has a particular action, apart from the 
others; if one of them gives way or acts too vigorously, the entire mass will be 
disturbed: when they all conspire to stick close, to mutually embrace, in the order 
of required proportions, they will comprise a whole which shall endure until they 
disturb one another. 
The application is easy: the organs of the body are connected to one another; they 
each have their district and their action; the relations between these actions, the 
resulting harmony, is what makes health. If this harmony is disturbed, either 
because one part relaxes, or another wins out over that which is its usual 
antagonist, if the actions are reversed, if they no longer follow the natural order, 
these changes will constitute more or less severe illnesses.12 
 
                                                 
11 [This is apparently a very old euphemism for an organ that, as we might say, ‗has a life of its own‘…—
C.W.] 
12 Bordeu (1751), § CXXV, in Bordeu (1818), vol. 1, p. 187. For more discussion of the different versions of 
the bee-swarm image in Bordeu, Maupertuis, Ménuret and Diderot see Wolfe ed. (2008) and Wolfe 
(2009b). 
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Similarly, in the Encyclopédie article ―Observation,‖ Ménuret mentions the bee-swarm 
and Bordeu in order to emphasize that life in the body occurs, or is best described as, a 
―connection of actions‖ (―liaison d‘actions‖): 
One could, following these authors, compare man to a flock of cranes which fly 
together, in a particular order, without mutually assisting or depending on one 
another. The Physicians or Philosophers who have studied and carefully 
observed man, have noticed this sympathy in all animal movements – this 
constant and necessary agreement in the interaction of the various parts, however 
disparate or distant from one another; they have also noticed the disturbance of 
the whole that results from the sensory disagreement of a single part. A famous 
physician (M. de Bordeu) and an illustrious physicist (M. de Maupertuis) likewise 
compared man, from this luminous and philosophical point of view, to a swarm 
of bees which strive together to hang to a tree branch. One can see them pressing 
and sustaining one another, forming a kind of whole (une espèce de tout), in which 
each living part contributes in its way, by the correspondence and direction of its 
movements, to sustain this kind of life of the whole body, if we may refer in this 
way to a mere connection of actions (liaison d’actions).13 
 
In a variety of other places including the important article on the pulse (―Pouls‖) 
Ménuret multiplies the structural, relational, positional approach to what makes living 
bodies unique. 
Not only is the form of vitalism expressed in the above passages far removed 
from claims about mysterious vital forces; by extension, this structural-functional 
approach to life is closer to materialism than is often said.  However, there is nothing 
monolithic about this; by the early nineteenth century the heads of the Montpellier 
medical school are steering it in a spiritualist (and royalist) direction.14 Additionally, 
significant figures such as Bichat are explicitly identifying Barthez‘s vital principle with 
Stahl‘s anima and Van Helmont‘s archaeus (Rey [2000], p. 361); Broussais claimed that 
                                                 
13 Ménuret, s.v. ―Observation,‖ Encyclopédie XI, pp. 318b-319a. (Further discussion might focus on the 
variety of organismic metaphors in addition to this one, such as the polyp – more than a metaphor! - or 
the same image of the beeswarm but used differently, such as Jonathan Swift‘s description of the brain as 
a ―crowd of little animals,‖ clinging together ―in the contexture we behold . . . like Bees in perpendicular 
swarm upon a Tree‖ (Swift, Mechanical Operation of the Spirit, 1704, cit. in Smith (2007), p. 18). 
14 See e.g. Lordat‘s Apologie de l’École de Montpellier which is an attack on the ‗materialism‘ of the École de 
Paris (Lordat 1842). For an interesting discussion of the political undertones (or overtones) of late 
Montpellier vitalism see Reill (1989), Lavabre-Bertrand (1992), Williams (2003). 
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Barthez ―founded medicine on his readings rather than observations.‖15 Bichat also says 
that the Montpellier physicians ―considered science philosophically; they would have 
made greater [scientific] progress if they had known more anatomy – Haller only made 
such great progress for that reason.‖16  In fact each of these figures has to denounce his 
immediate predecessor as a vitalist… Gayon (1994) makes the useful point that we 
should be careful when using, say, Bernard‘s judgments about ‗vitalism‘ as historical 
pieces of evidence, since Barthez, Bernard and ‗us‘ all have different conceptions of 
matter, living matter and the relations between them.17 One can add that ‗vitalism‘ is 
also a feu follet, perpetually reinvented in order that one thinker seeking to articulate a 
claim for the autonomy of biological entities (like Bichat‘s famous ―la vie est l‘ensemble 
des fonctions qui résistent à la mort‖) can accuse his predecessor of having been the real 
vitalist (Oyama 2010). 
 If the Montpellier vitalists were not ‗cranks‘, who did believe the sort of thing 
Crick makes fun of? Georg-Ernest Stahl, a court physician to Duke Johann Ernst of 
Saxon-Weimar and subsequently, as of 1694, a Professor of Medicine at the University of 
Halle.  
 
2. Stahl and Driesch 
 
Stahl bluntly stated a problem about Life in the early 1700s: in all these competing 
theories of the human body, notably the very successful mechanistic theories, ―Life was 
never mentioned nor defined, and I could find no logical definition provided.‖18 To 
follow Stahl‘s suggestion, we could say that Life is either discussed but immediately 
                                                 
15 F. Broussais, Examen des doctrines médicales (1821), quoted in Lavabre-Bertrand (1992), p. 89. 
16 X. Bichat, Discours sur l’étude de la physiologie, included in Recherches physiologiques sur la vie et sur la mort. 
17 Gayon (1994), p. 99f. This is not the place to attempt proper discussion of Bernard, not least since he is 
not part of our eighteenth-century mandate; suffice it to say that he extends a kind of structural model 
further, as is best-known in his analysis of physiological determinism. On Bernard and vitalism see 
Normandin (2007). 
18 Stahl (1706b), in Stahl (1859), p. 224. 
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dissipated into the entities and processes which subserve it, or promoted to the extent 
that vital spirits, vital heat, animation are so co-extensive to the field of investigation 
that Life again dissipates into the analysis as a whole. Stahl‘s answer is a multi-tiered, 
extremely confusing system with metaphysical and physical levels, with specifically 
medical, biological, chemical and even physical levels; but he is, notoriously, an animist  
because he considers that the body and its organs are literally mere instruments of the 
soul, a position sometimes revised so that ―organs are not, as the name might suggest, 
mere instruments,‖ but nevertheless, ―it is the soul that makes the lungs breathe, the 
heart beat, the blood circulate, the stomach digest, the liver secrete.‖19 
Despite their criticism of mechanistic models for Life – for their inertness, for 
their inapplicability to living beings, and so forth – the Montpellier vitalists are quite 
dismissive of this intrusion of a non-medical entity (the soul) into medical explanations. 
(The missing figure in this story is Haller – there is in fact a kind of triangulation 
between Montpellier vitalists, Stahlian animism, and Hallerian ‗micromechanism‘. 
Haller micromechanist but in a complex dance with vitalism. Cf his 1772 article ―Faculté 
vitale,‖20 where he says faculté vitale is a nom d‘attente.) 
Here is Ménuret: 
Who wouldn‘t laugh at an animist or Stahlian who would argue that this illness is 
a gift of Nature or the soul, a kind and farsighted mother who directs all efforts to 
heal the illness, and even exacerbates them on the pretext of necessity, hoping for 
benefits that one hopelessly expects from elsewhere? 
(―Ténesme,‖ Enc. XVI, p. 137a). 
 
In a very different way, Bordeu, in his masterpiece the Recherches anatomiques sur la 
position et la function des glandes (1751), when discussing the (very philosophical) 
problem of whether the secretory process of the glands can be reduced to a type of 
sensation or not, makes a gentler, but equally distancing comment on Stahl‘s notion of 
anima. Bordeu answers his question in the affirmative: each gland, each orifice will 
possess its own unique ―taste‖ so to speak which will enable it to accept or reject various 
                                                 
19 Stahl (1706a), § xcviii, in Stahl (1859), p. 347. 
20 In Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire universel raisonné des connoissances humaines (1770-1779), vol. XVII, 244b-
250a. 
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substances. And when he calls it a type of sensation he adds a footnote to the word 
‗sensation‘, and emphasizes that both this idea of sensation and Stahl‘s anima are 
metaphors: 
 (*) This is again one of these metaphors which must be allowed us ; those who 
consider these questions closely know just how difficult it is to explain oneself, 
when it comes to speaking of the force which so carefully directs a thousand 
singular motions in the human body and its parts; what terms should we use to 
describe them? For instance, certain movements in plants and even certain 
properties of minerals; some ‗physicists‘ [physiciens], struck by these movements, 
have had recourse to particular causes. We will discuss Stahl‘s hypothesis 
elsewhere: he claimed that the soul directed everything in the animal body. 
Whatever the case may be, we can state that all living parts are directed by a 
preserving or conservative force [force conservatrice] which is ever-vigilant; does 
this force belong, in certain respects, to the essence of a portion of matter, or is it a 
necessary attribute of its combinations? Once again, here we can only suggest a 
way of conceiving things, metaphorical expressions, comparisons...21 
To say that the Stahlian concept of soul is a metaphor (which Stahl does not say!) is 
essentially to say that the concept has functional value (or not) depending on how well it 
models phenomena – rather than making a claim about what sorts of things exist. If 
Bordeu were writing sometime after the 1970s he would quite likely have spoken of 
such images as ‗heuristics‘.  
Stahlian animism and vitalism as articulated in the Montpellier school are thus 
two distinct models of ‗life‘ – of organic order, of the approach required to understand 
living beings and the possible basis for construction of a ‗science‘ of such beings. 
(Neither of these directly flow into the constitution of ‗biology‘ as a science, in the first 
years of the nineteenth century22; Stahl is much more concerned with chemistry, even if 
it is in part what we would call organic chemistry, and the montpelliérains are, 
tautologically, much more concerned with medicine. One would have to look to 
Blumenbach and Wolff for vitalistic biology proper.) Of course within the Montpellier 
school there is a spectrum of views, from Sauvages‘ more animism-friendly work23 to 
                                                 
21 Bordeu (1751), § CVIII, p. 163. 
22 Barsanti, Caron, Wolfe forthcoming 2011. 
23 Sauvages praises the ―Stahlians‖ who have both ―the support of the ancients and an infinite number of 
reasons in their favour derived from practice‖ (Sauvages [1752 ]in Sauvages [1770], II, p. 12, note (g)).. 
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Fouquet or Ménuret‘s materialistic and in fact mechanism-friendly views. Ménuret after 
all goes as far as presenting the human body – la machine humaine, he says, although we 
should not make too much out of this choice of terms, since ‗machine‘ was often used to 
simply mean ‗body‘24– as a structural ensemble of ―springs,‖ which taken as a whole 
―all pursue an overall motion‖; a kind of ―irritability or sensitivity spreads throughout, 
animates the springs, excites their motions,‖25 etc.: good mechanistic language! But the 
point is that we have a substantival form of vitalism (also ‗ontological‘) and a functional 
form. (I can discuss the relation to materialism further if desired: the key point there is 
less of a change in our picture of vitalism than of materialism – but how? ‗Vital 
materialism‘ as portrayed by Lenoir? Reill? Belaval?) 
The Stahlian belief in ‗anima‘ can be compared to what we now call the ‗neo-
vitalist‘ position of the embryologist Hans Driesch in the late nineteenth century.26 
Driesch comes out of the school of Wilhelm Roux‘s Entwicklungsmechanik or study of the 
mechanisms of the developmental process. His experiments with sea urchin eggs 
involved halving the two blastomeres (daughter cells) of the egg and successfully 
producing two whole embryos and larvae, complete in every respect. This total equality 
of the halved eggs is their "totipotency." The cells derived from the egg were termed by 
him a harmonious equipotential system;27 Driesch became so absorbed with this feature 
                                                 
24 The Dictionnaire de l’Académie, in 1694, defines ‗machine‘ as ―a set of parts or organs which form a 
whole, living or not, and produce determinate effects without transmitting a force externally; organism, 
body‖ (cit. in Cayrou [1948], s.v. ―Machine,‖ p. 530). Buffon comfortably speaks in the same sentence of 
‗animal economy‘ and ‗machine‘, or ―la mécanique vivante‖ and ―le mécanisme de l‘économie animale‖ 
(Buffon (1753), pp. 3-4; article ―Histoire naturelle,‖ Enc. VIII, 226b). By the nineteenth century the situation 
is different, with the Encyclopédie méthodique explaining (in 1808) that one should no longer use the 
expression ―machine humaine‖ … but that ―animal economy‖ or ―organism‖ are suitable substitutes: ―It 
is preferable to use the synonymous expressions ‗living economy‘, ‗vital economy‘, ‗animal economy‘, 
‗organism‘, ‗organic mass‘, ‗the entire economy of the human body‘. The term ‗machine‘ seems to refer to 
a system of causes and effects which belongs wholly to the mechanistic theory‖ (―Machine,‖ in 
Encyclopédie méthodique, 1808, 310). 
25 Ménuret de Chambaud, art. ―Spasme,‖ Enc. XV, 435b. 
26 For a different perspective on Stahl‘s work that seeks to minimize the significance of his metaphysical 
claims and thereby emphasize the ‗practical‘, ‗empirical‘ side of his work, see K.-M. Chang‘s recent essays, 
e.g. Chang (2004). 
27 Cf. Driesch (1914), p. 209. 
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that he gave up experimental work and taught philosophy at the University of Leipzig, 
developing the idea that entelechies exist in all living organisms. The historical 
background to which he appealed (distinct, then, from our history of vitalism) was 
primarily that of the physiologist Johann Friedrich Blumenbach and his notion of a 
Bildungstrieb or nisus formativus (formative drive) in living organisms, and secondarily 
that of Caspar Friedrich Wolff, who had developed an early critique of mechanistic 
reduction of life targeting preformationism and emphasizing the merits of the epigenetic 
account of embryonic development. In Driesch‘s view, the importance of these figures 
lay in their renewal of a vitalist thinking which had lain dormant since Aristotle (the 
Montpellier school does not appear here). More relevant for our purposes, Driesch‘s 
appeal to these thinkers shows how embryology becomes the standard-bearer of 
vitalism within biology itself. Faced with the evidence that there was no physical 
structure we can find in the sea urchin embryo which is responsible for the "regulative" 
or "equipotential" force, he felt obliged to posit a vital force, the entelechy.28 Canguilhem 
comments on Driesch‘s ‗shift‘ from science to metaphysics: 
―Le biologiste vitaliste devenu philosophe de la biologie croit apporter à la 
philosophie des capitaux et ne lui apporte en réalité que des rentes qui ne cessent 
de baisser à la bourse des valeurs scientifiques, du fait seul que se poursuit la 
recherche à laquelle il ne participe plus. Tel est le cas de Driesch abandonnant la 
recherche scientifique pour la spéculation et même l‘enseignement de la 
philosophie. Il y a là une espèce d‘abus de confiance sans préméditation. Le 
prestige du travail scientifique lui vient d‘abord de son dynamisme interne. 
L‘ancien savant se voit privé de ce prestige auprès des savants militants. Il croit 
qu‘il le conserve chez les philosophes. Il n‘en doit rien être. La philosophie, étant 
une entreprise autonome de réflexion, n‘admet aucun prestige, pas même celui 
de savant, à plus forte raison celui d‘ex-savant.‖ (―Aspects du vitalisme‖, in La 
connaissance de la vie, 2e éd., Paris, Vrin, 1965, p. 94). 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
For more on Driesch cf Marcel Weber, “Hans Drieschs Argumente für den Vitalismus,” Philosophia 
Naturalis 36: 265-295 (1999).  
28 This was critiqued early on by Bergson, sometimes wrongly associated with Driesch under the banner 
of vitalism. Bergson‘s response to this claim of a life-force in all living organisms is to ask: where? at what 
level? He expresses doubts that nature can be interpreted strictly in terms of this internal "finality" 
(teleology, purposiveness); Wolsky & Wolsky (1992), p. 156f. 
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Another version of his ‗experimentum crucis‘ (on sea urchin eggs), as discussed by 
Cassirer: 
The results of experiment had shown that perfectly normal organisms could 
develop from embryos which had suffered from very severe injury produced by 
the experiment: thus when the embryo was bisected an entirely normal larva of 
half size developed, and when embryos were crushed between glass plates so as 
to disarrange their cells completely, the wholly abnormal positional relationships 
did not necessarily exclude the formation of a normal, whole organism. No 
confusion resulted in the system. The embryo with misplaced cells remained an 
autonomous whole, and followed the usual course of development undisturbed.29 
The conclusion drawn was that since the formative power at work is not 
interfered with by division, separation or displacement, it must be a ‗something‘ 
without spatial character and to which no definite position in space can be 
assigned.30 
 
Cassirer adds that Driesch tends to describe this ‗something‘ in psychic terms, 
although he moves from speaking literally of a soul in earlier writings to speaking of 
something soul-like, ultimately, an entelechy. An entelechy uses the physicochemical 
forces of the organism, but is not ‗of‘ them. 
The classic refutation of Drieschian vitalism came with the Vienna Circle, notably 
Moritz Schlick‘s ―Philosophy of Organic Life.‖ The argument relies on a basic fact of 
physics, the causal closure of the physical (space-time) world, to point out contra 
Driesch that there cannot be nonspatial causes of organic processes which are 
themselves necessarily spatial. For Driesch the entelechy is a life-force affected by 
various physical constraints in the cell. Schlick seizes the opportunity to say: if all the 
various sub-systems are required as active constraints on this force, but this force is not 
accessible to us, we can just factor it out! For a non-physical entity to profitably interact 
with a physical entity, or bring about a physical process, it must at some point itself 
become physical. Driesch cannot reconcile the action of his non-physical entelechies 
with the basic (methodological or ontological) determinism of Newtonian physics. A 
non-spatial force such as the entelechy vanishes, in this case; ―if the causes are fully 
contained in the initial conditions, then there is no reason whatsoever for the 
                                                 
29 Driesch, ―Experiments on the Egg of the Sea-Urchin,‖ The Science and Philosophy of the Organism I, p. 59f. 
30 E. Cassirer, The Problem of Knowledge, trans. W. Woglom & C. Hendel (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 
1950), p. 195. 
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assumption of a non-spatial intermediary.‖31 Schlick comes out squarely on the other 
side: biological laws can and will be reduced to physical laws. This refutation of 
substantival vitalism is thus also a full-fledged reductionist view of the nature of the 
biological. What we will see with Canguilhem (himself influenced by Claude Bernard, 
who himself was interested by Diderot‘s late writings on physiology32) is that one can 
share the rejection of mysterious vital forces without necessarily adopting such a 
reductionist approach to the biological. 
It is significant to note the absence of Darwin from any of the biological 
references of the Vienna Circle: it‘s all Driesch. Not that this means Darwin confirms 
vitalism! 33 
The ‗functional‘ form of vitalism can be explicated further, not least with 
reference to Claude Bernard (see Normandin, but esp. Bechtel 2007, section 3, for an 
interesting treatment of 19th c. vitalism or rather the use of the appellation ‗vitalism‘). 
 
3. Vitalism as an attitude : Canguilhem 
 Georges Canguilhem is well known chiefly as the author of The Normal and the 
Pathological, and as Foucault‘s teacher and mentor. He was also the author of a variety of 
influential essays on the history and philosophy of the life sciences, focusing on the 
period between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. Less well known is the fact 
that Canguilhem often refers to vitalism in his work, going as far as describing himself 
as one in the Foreword to his these d’État on the development of the notion of reflex 
action: ―Il nous importe peu d‘être ou tenu pour vitaliste…‖ and presenting the book 
itself as a ―defense of vitalist biology.‖34 Even if he is wearing the hat of the historian of 
medicine, looking at the construction of a concept (say, the cell theory), Canguilhem the 
                                                 
31 Schlick (1953), p. 536. 
32 Barral (1900). 
33 As in the recent claim by the theoretical biologist Robert Rosen that ―Evolution has come to do for 
biology today what vitalism did for it previously‖ (Rosen (1991), p. 255); an assertion of uniqueness and 
thus unexplainability in terms of inanimate nature). (Then one gets to Canguilhem and Darwin...) 
34 Canguilhem (1955), Avant-Propos, p. 1. 
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philosopher asks highly ‗motivated‘ questions of science, in a manner which 
undoubtedly owes a great deal to Bachelard‘s historical epistemology. The history of 
science has to study possible conceptual developments rather than just invalidate the 
past (the error of ‗presentism‘). What this entails for vitalism is that it has a specifically 
philosophical place, whether it is scientifically ‗validated‘ or ‗refuted‘, and apart from its 
status as a scientific ‗construction‘. 
In this sense, Canguilhem suggests, vitalism is not like geocentrism or phlogiston (to 
pick two classic cases of scientific ‗errors‘): it is not refutable in quite the same way.35 (Or 
Haldane: ―Vitalism thus represents no clearly definable working hypothesis,‖ so that he 
suggests it is not worth ―considering further‖36). 
 Vitalism is generally considered to have been ‗refuted‘ twice. First, according to a 
celebrated scientific tale, with Friedrich Wöhler‘s synthesis of urea in 1828, which 
showed that organic substances can be produced out of inorganic compounds, thus 
rendering the claim that the chemistry of the living body is categorically distinct from 
that of inanimate bodies, invalid. Second, a century later, this time because of physics, in 
early twentieth-century Vienna Circle arguments against Hans Driesch and Bergson, in 
the name of the causal closure of the space-time world.37 The undead character of 
vitalism shows up in the first case, with Wöhler‘s synthesis of urea, when people start to 
describe the purported refutation as a ―chemical legend‖ (including because the 
synthesis was actually only performed by Berthelot later on), and when chemists like 
Berzelius continue to speak of vital forces afterwards38; in the second case, substantival 
                                                 
35 Canguilhem (1965), p. 84. 
36 Haldane, in Haldane et al. (1918), p. 12. 
37 See Frank (1998 [1932]), especially chapter 4; Wolsky and Wolsky (1992). 
38 McKie (1954). See also Schiller (1967) (on Berzelius and von Liebig); Ramberg (2000).  For the classic, 
‗heroic‘ view of Wöhler see Jacques (1950). Raymond Ruyer conversely asserts the link between chemistry 
and vitalism, declaring that it was ―lack of chemical knowledge‖ that made seventeenth-century Cartesian 
biologists be mechanists (Ruyer [1958], p. 51). If we look back at Stahl, he insists on the importance of 
chemistry for conceptualizing what is unique in organic beings (their characteristic mixtio rather than 
mere aggregates) but, somewhat dialectically, he adds that once that reaches the level of a theoria medica 
vera , then one can dispense with the chemical analysis of bodies, like the ladder we leave behind after 
having climbed up it (not his image!). Stahl (1706b) in Stahl (1859), vol. 2, p. 224. 
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vitalism is refuted, not what we might call explanatory or heuristic vitalism – which are 
derivative forms of what I‘ve earlier called functional vitalism. 
So not only is vitalism a unique kind of historical object; much more 
metaphysically, Canguilhem suggests that it is Life itself which dictates a certain kind of 
attitude on the part of the inquirer. There is something about Life that places the knower 
in a special relation to it. Indeed Canguilhem frequently makes an overtly metaphysical, 
ahistorical claim that the living animal is necessarily a knower, so that conversely, the 
nature of Life itself forces the knower to approach it in a certain way (the echoes of the 
first sentence of Aristotle‘s Metaphysics, ―All men by nature desire to know,‖ are 
probably deliberate).  
The idea is that vitalism is a fundamental existential attitude – not just one 
historical episode amongst others: 
Vitalism expresses a permanent requirement or demand [exigence] of life in living 
beings, the self-identity of life which is immanent in living beings. This explains 
why mechanistic biologists and rationalist philosophers criticize vitalism for 
being nebulous and vague. It is normal, if vitalism is primarily a ‗demand‘, that it 
is difficult to formulate it in a series of determinations.39 
 
Vitalism expresses a permanent ―requirement‖ or ―demand‖ of life as present in living 
beings; the self-identity of Life immanent within living beings. What exactly is this 
―requirement‖? Something teleological? Purposive? Foucault (??), seeking to give a 
charitable interpretation of the place of vitalism in Canguilhem‘s thought as what we 
might call a heuristic concept, quotes another passage from this article in which 
Canguilhem uses the word exigence again (he uses it 7 times in all): vitalism is ―more a 
requirement than a method, an ethics rather than a theory.‖40 Now, it may be a 
requirement rather than a theory, but it is, I suggest, a big requirement: that Life itself, 
symmetrically to the inquirer‘s attitude, is understood as self-positing, spontaneous 
activity (I don‘t discuss ethics here but one observation would be that as this is a 
                                                 
39 Canguilhem, ―Aspects du vitalisme,‖ in Canguilhem (1965), p. 86. 
40 Ibid., p. 88. Although the image of the egg sounds more like Driesch (except it‘s also Harvey and the 
Oxford physiologists) than like Bordeu or Ménuret. 
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specifically medical vitalism, that comes with an ethics, as the Hippocratic motif in 
Montpellier vitalism also indicates): 
It is certain that the vitalists view generation as the basic biological phenomenon, 
for the images it generates and the problems it raises impact all other biological 
phenomena. A vitalist, I would suggest, is someone who is led to reflect on the 
nature of life more because of the contemplation of an egg than because of s/he 
has handled a hoist or a bellows.41  
 
Notice how the above passage moves imperceptibly from the historical (a description of 
―the vitalists‖) to the assertive (―a vitalist is…‖), and even to the prescriptive (in his best-
known writings on the ‗normal and the pathological‘, which stress the way in which an 
organism is its own norm of existence). 
 Vitalism then has two dimensions in Canguilhem‘s thought: on the one hand it is 
heuristic, a claim that living phenomena need to be approached in a certain way in order 
to be understood; on the other hand, it also possesses a more ontological dimension. 
Consider the example Canguilhem gives in ―Aspects du vitalisme‖: vitalism is not like 
(the theory of) phlogiston or geocentrism. Now, faced with this ‗fact‘ that vitalism is not 
like phlogiston, there are two possible responses: 
— it‘s not like phlogiston because it‘s true and thus one‘s ontology needs to include 
it (like Driesch‘s entelechies); 
— it‘s not like phlogiston because it has this heuristic value, or explanatory power. 
In fact, it‘s not entirely clear where Canguilhem falls in this divide. However, his 
comments on vitalism as an ―orientation‖ (what I have called an attitude) tend towards 
the latter interpretation. Indeed, it is clear that both philosophically and as a historian of 
science (to reintroduce this naïve distinction) he is careful to distinguish his claims from 
the more inflated ones of substantival vitalism.  
Canguilhem is careful to distinguish strong metaphysical vitalism from the views 
(and practices) of the eighteenth-century vitalists, in contradistinction to people like 
Driesch. This is the theme of ‗biological Newtonianism‘ (referring to the popularity of 
Newtonian analogies amongst the vitalists in the eighteenth century, among others): 
                                                 
41 Ibid. 
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Eighteenth-century vitalists are . . . not impenitent metaphysicians but rather 
prudent positivists, which is to say, in that period, Newtonians. Vitalism is first of 
all the rejection of all metaphysical theories of the essence of life. This why most 
of the vitalists referred to Newton as the model of a scientist concerned with 
observation and experiment. . . . Vitalism ultimately means the recognition of life 
as an original set or realm [ordre] of phenomena, and thus the recognition of the 
specificity of biological knowledge.42 
 
A medical vitalist in the eighteenth century is not a substantival, metaphysical vitalist of 
the late nineteenth or early twentieth century. Indeed, Canguilhem goes as far as to say 
that eighteenth-century vitalists are anti-metaphysicians opposed to the strong 
metaphysics of animism or mechanism.43 As Karen Detlefsen has suggested in a 
different context, ontological reduction does not have to affect the ‗scientific‘ pertinence 
of the distinction between the living and the non-living.44 
The importance of the Newtonian motif is that, by means of an analogy with 
Newton‘s method in positing an unknown entity (such as gravity) from which he can 
then derive a series of mathematical equations with real tangible value – for instance in 
linking together phases of the moon and tides – the vitalists can say (I‘m paraphrasing 
Barthez notably): let me posit this unknown called ‗life‘ and derive from it various other 
phenomena, from digestion to sensation, to the functioning of the glands: these 
suddenly appear as interconnected, goal-oriented processes which do not exist either in 
an inanimate mechanism or (a frequent opposition) in the same body but in the state of a 
corpse. But significantly I (or rather the vitalist, here, Barthez) will make no ontological 
claims about the nature of this vital principle, or even attempt to make causal 
connections between such a principle and observable phenomena: ―I am as indifferent 
as could be regarding Ontology considered as the science of entities.‖45 
                                                 
42 Canguilhem (1955), p. 113. 
43 Canguilhem, ―Le normal et le pathologique,‖ in Canguilhem (1965), p. 156. 
44 Detlefsen (2007). An excellent historical example of someone who rejects mechanistic explanations of 
generation at the scientific level without being a metaphysical antimechanist, is Claude Perrault; see 
Perrault (1680-1688), and the discussion of Azouvi (1982, 1985). 
45 Barthez (1806), p. 96, note 17. 
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Returning to Canguilhem, there is a long and difficult passage in ―Aspects du 
vitalisme,‖ in which he rejects Drieschian vitalism (or mysterianism as we would call it 
today) more clearly than anywhere else: 
In sum, the classical vitalist grants that living beings belong to a physical 
environment, yet asserts that they are an exception to physical laws. This is the 
inexcusable philosophical mistake, in my view. There can be no kingdom within a 
kingdom [empire dans un empire], or else there is no kingdom at all. There can only 
be one philosophy of empire, that which rejects division and imperialism. . . . One 
cannot defend the originality of biological phenomena and by extension, of 
biology, by delimiting a zone of indeterminacy, dissidence or heresy within an 
overall physicochemical environment of motion and inertia. If we are to affirm the 
originality of the biological, it must be as a reign over the totality of experience, not over 
little islands of experience [un règne sur le tout de l’expérience et non pas sur des îlots 
dans l’expérience]. Ultimately, classical vitalism is (paradoxically) too modest, in its 
reluctance to universalize its conception of experience.46 
 
‗Classical‘ vitalism as described here is what is commonly termed substantival vitalism. 
And Canguilhem‘s diagnosis of an ―inexcusable philosophical mistake‖ is clear enough. 
But what should we make then of his defense of the ―originality of biological 
phenomena,‖ i.e. the autonomy of biology, as a ―reign over the totality of experience‖? 
What looks at first glance like metaphysical holism might instead be an ‗attitudinal‘ 
conception, that is, a point of view on experience. Indeed, even when Canguilhem 
discusses the uniqueness of organisms he never denies that their ‗holistic‘ quality is 
enabled by various regulatory processes or mechanisms that subserve the whole and 
preserve its integrity (much like Cannon‘s notion of homeostasis, itself explicitly 
indebted at least in its theoretical form to Bernard‘s notion of milieu intérieur47). 
 Unlike the ―classical vitalist‖ (who corresponds in our discussion both to Stahl 
and Driesch, and to vitalists as targeted by philosophers of biology such as Sarkar and 
Gilbert or earlier Moritz Schlick), Canguilhem insists, using Spinoza‘s phrase, that we 
are not a kingdom within a kingdom, an imperium in imperio! That is, the laws of the 
physical world apply in full to all living beings, humans included, without exceptions. 
So all problems would appear to be solved. Yet this statement creates new problems! 
                                                 
46 Canguilhem (1965), p. 95, emphasis mine. 
47 Cooper (2008). 
20 
 
Granted, to the standard question, how can one be a vitalist and reject any imperium in 
imperio?, we can answer on Canguilhem‘s behalf that one can be a constructivist or 
heuristic vitalist; but what do we do then with all the talk of ‗Life itself‘, le vivant? 
Similarly, if we grant in addition that the ontological dimension in his vitalism – the 
stress on how Life itself creates a certain attitude on the part of the knower – is not to be 
confused with mysterianism, we are left with the rather opaque invocation in the above 
quotation of ―experience.‖ It doesn‘t seem to fit with the rest of his views … except if we 
recall that he was, after all, significantly influenced by the work of Kurt Goldstein 
(known for his ‗holistic‘ theory of organism, Goldstein 1934/1995, see also Wolfe 2010), 
who he greatly contributed to introduce into French discussions. Goldstein and 
Canguilhem both stress the importance of the relation between the ‗subject‘ (the knower, 
the philosopher or scientist, etc.) and Life itself. 
 Indeed, in a very real sense one cannot distinguish between a historical claim and 
a philosophical claim in Canguilhem‘s ‗history of vitalism‘ or ‗vitalism‘.  Of course, 
dialectically enough, Canguilhem‘s blurring of the divide between being a historian-
épistémologue focusing on the life sciences, and being a ‗metaphysical vitalist‘ can again 
be seen in a more positive light, i.e., in more manageable, ‗attitudinal‘ terms: one can 
argue that (a) the ontological dimension, (b) that of experience, and (c) the existential 
dimension all cohere with his claim that vitalism is an ―attitude‖ (―une orientation de la 
pensée biologique‖) rather than strictly an episode (―une étape de sa démarche‖).48 And 
if, as present-day historians of science, we point out that he gives a partisan reading of 
biological thought intended to delegitimize Cartesian mechanism in favor of biological 
epigenesis – and vitalism, then why shouldn‘t we also acknowledge that present-day 
biological thought is, if not fully reversing course, at least arguing in a strongly 
‗epigenetic‘ direction and privileging developmental biology over genetics (or at least an 
essentialist vision of genetic information)?49 
                                                 
48 ―Aspects du vitalisme,‖ in Canguilhem (1965), p. 84. 
49 See van Speybroeck et al. (2002) and the work of Susan Oyama, passim. 
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 Nevertheless, even if we can agree that vitalism is unlike geocentrism or 
phlogiston in the way Canguilhem suggested, and we can see the possible interest in 
discussing vitalism as an ‗attitude‘, we should also recognize that Canguilhem‘s 
revisionist project to put the life sciences at center stage in the history of science overall 
(which had traditionally been dominated by the hard sciences) is bound up with strong 
ontological commitments, and a certain conceptual vagueness to boot. Namely, his 
project must amount to a claim regarding the specificity of its object, but it is not easy to 
make out exactly which claim he wants to make: 
— Life itself as an object is ontologically unique, including in its anomalousness; 
— living entities are meaningful and meaning-producing entities and thus have to 
be understood as such (this covers both the existential and the Goldsteinian 
aspects of his claim). 
 Canguilhem‘s vagueness appears, e.g., when he denies that vitalism is a 
metaphysics, and then adds immediately afterwards that it is ―the recognition of the 
originality of the fact of life [le fait vital].‖50  
 
4. Conclusion 
 I have tried to illustrate the existence of three forms of vitalism: substantival, 
functional and attitudinal. It is typically the first form which is targeted in critiques of 
vitalism (such as that dating back to the Vienna Circle); it is represented here by Stahl 
and Driesch. The second form matches up fairly well with what philosophers of science 
in contemporary times would call ‗heuristic‘ concepts of mechanism or organism, as 
explanatory structures or models. Historically, this ‗functional‘ kind of vitalism is 
associated with the Montpellier school and with the attempt to articulate a relation 
between parts and whole in which the parts are construed as little lives (recall the image 
of the bee-swarm, a Life composed of many little lives). A bit more from Bechtel 2007. 
The third form is chiefly articulated by Georges Canguilhem (under the influence of 
                                                 
50 Canguilhem, ―Le normal et le pathologique,‖ in Canguilhem (1965), p. 156. 
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Kurt Goldstein‘s philosophy of organism); we might also call it ‗projectivist‘ or 
‗constructivist‘, since it stresses that there is something about Life that leads us to adopt 
a certain standpoint towards it in order to understand it properly (in its totality, 
directedness, etc.). Of course, Canguilhem also plays on an ontological set of 
associations since he claims that it is Life itself which affects both the scientific theories 
we formulate in relation to it, and our experience in general. It is possible to see a kind 
of development or gradual evolution in these three forms of vitalism, although one can 
also approach them as separate and parallel to one another.  
A few questions then arise: 
 The question of the posterity of the Montpellier form of vitalism is difficult to 
address, partly because of the general difficulties in tying Enlightenment 
natural philosophy or medicine to developments beginning in the nineteenth 
century (‗positive science‘). I mentioned earlier the fact that the words 
‗vitalism‘ and ‗biology‘ are coined at about the same time, and believe this is 
worth investigating. Just because an episode such as Montpellier vitalism 
does not get to be part of the history of medicine the way John Snow‘s 
discovery of cholera does, does not mean we have to go along with Francis 
Crick‘s pronouncement quoted above, or with similar scientific views that 
vitalism is a kind of verbiage quickly dispelled by molecularized life science.51 
For one thing, there is Canguilhem‘s point about the difference between 
vitalism and phlogiston or geocentrism. For another, we have this intriguing 
possibility that vitalism in the form presented here – not a theory of ‗wonder 
tissue‘ or ‗vital forces‘ – is a source of intellectual support to current 
movements in biological thought such as epigenetics, developmental systems 
theory, evolutionary developmental biology (evo-devo), and so forth. After 
all, Driesch did claim that ―All believers in epigenesis are Vitalists‖52! But this 
                                                 
51 Bosc (1913). 
52 Driesch (1914), p. 39. 
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kind of connection, in terms of some of the oppositions that have structured 
the history and philosophy of biology (here, epigenesis versus preformation 
in the eighteenth century and epigenesis versus genetic reductionism in the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries) is quite different from the valuative, 
polemical tone of those who claim that ‗vitalism‘ is a kind of suprahistorical, 
almost messianic entity that can come back to save us in times of need, such 
as: ―The affirmation . . . of ‗vitalism‘ as an intellectual requirement which aims 
to acknowledge the originality of Life, is just as significant today when the 
conjunction of a biochemical materialism and a mathematical formalism tend 
to negate [this originality], the better to ‗neuronalize‘ thought.53 (this from the 
former student of Althusser, Dominique Lecourt !) 
 There is also the related issue of how closely we can link, or correlate, 
‗ontological shifts‘ with the emergence of a science. In this particular case, 
there is the very broad question ‗does vitalism impact the history of science‘ 
and the slightly more specific one ‗does vitalism lead to a science such as 
biology?‘54 One version of this is to emphasize how, faced with mechanism 
and animism at opposite extremes, vitalism avoided ―the worst of both 
systems‖ and developed the best parts, notably their explanatory richness and 
a kind of synthetic experimental protocol. Roger French suggests that out of 
this ―What emerged was the idea of biological properties, that is, qualities 
(principally of sensation and motion) that were unique to living systems and 
                                                 
53 Lecourt (1993), p. 269. 
54 I remember once reading something which suggested that each time biology takes a ‗step forward‘, it is 
a vitalistic moment, even if this is subsequently ‗refuted‘ or ontologically eliminated, but cannot find the 
source of this idea anymore (I thought it was Depew and Grene‘s Philosophy of Biology: An Episodic History 
but it does not seem to be in there). Prima facie this seems obviously wrong (the discovery of DNA is not 
a very vitalistic moment) but there is something to the idea that each time one has pushed back the 
boundaries of ‗pure physicalism‘. Philosophers of biology following David Hull and then Alex Rosenberg 
would then argue about ‗ontological autonomy‘ versus ‗explanatory autonomy‘ with respect to biology. 
See Hilde Hein‘s papers (Hein 1968, 1969). The first paper discusses 'Mechanism and Vitalism as 
Meta-theoretical Commitments'; in the second one she tries to show how the debate between molecular 
biology and organicism manifests the same kind of tension as the old debate between mechanism and 
vitalism. In both cases more of ad hominem issue depending on prior commitments, than general 
experimental opposition at level of data. 
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not to be derived from a mechanical model.‖55 I am not sure this actually 
happened in the way he presents it. For one thing, the figure who much more 
closely matches this story is Haller, whose relation to vitalism is complicated 
to say the least (also for reasons like the rivalry between him and Bordeu). 
It is sometimes suggested that vitalism is primarily a vision developed by 
physicians, not biologists, which is why it is not so surprising that it has 
vanished from the philosophy of biology. This specifically medical dimension 
can be conveyed in the basic claim that all living beings die and get sick – 
hence there is a necessary axiological element (that is, an element of values or 
norms). This appears specifically in Canguilhem‘s focus on, and interest in 
Bichat.56 
 It seems plausible that this story about vitalism should impact debates going 
back to Foucault about the status of ‗Life‘ in the eighteenth century, the 
existence of which he curiously denied.57 Indeed a key difference between the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in this context seems to be the 
‗biologization‘ of various issues: case in point, Diderot‘s short and provocative 
Encyclopédie entry ―Spinosistes‖, which describes ―modern Spinozists‖ 
essentially as people who theorize biological epigenesis (see Wolfe [2009a]). 
La Mettrie makes a similar distinction between ancient and modern 
Epicureans (i.e. in each case the ‗modern‘ variant of the theory is explicitly 
tied to new biological and/or medical ideas). 
 But in none of these cases (Stahl, the Montpellier vitalists, Canguilhem, etc.) 
does it appear to me to be straightforwardly the case that a vitalist ‗theory‘ or 
                                                 
55 French (1981), p. 130. 
56 Thanks to Jean Gayon for pointing this out to me. 
57 As is well known, Foucault declared – controversially – in Les mots et les choses (1966, pp. 139, 173-174) 
that ‗Life‘ did not exist before the emergence of biology as a science bearing that name, in the nineteenth 
century. In contrast, Canguilhem, despite being a discontinuist in the history of science, holds that 
something called ‗Life‘ determines the emergence of various theoretical enterprises, and exerts a kind of 
traction on the knower / theorist / scientist. Further analyses could extend this distinction to discussions 
of vitalism in contemporary thought (Deleuze and beyond — Roberto Esposito, Bios). 
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‗claim‘ or ‗metaphor‘ gets naturalized or formalized or quantified and turned 
into mainstream science – with the exception of Blumenbach et al. However, 
there is a distinctive ‗form of life‘ that emerges in the reflections of the 
Montpellier School and the various related projects, whether antecedent 
(Glisson, Willis, Stahl), contemporary and congenial (Diderot), contemporary 
and competitive (Haller), or posterior (Cabanis, Bichat, Bernard). In that sense 
I hope to have called attention to a different ‗face‘ of vitalism than the one 
usually seen. 
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